On October 6, 1993, Michael Jordan held a press conference in Deerfield, Illinois to announce his retirement from the NBA, at the age of 30. For that moment, the world stopped. I was 7 and a huge Chicago Bulls fan. All I really knew of existence to that point was that Michael Jordan was great, and I had no reason to suspect that would ever change. I played hundreds of hours of basketball from my Little Tikes hoop to the driveway, and I never played the role of anyone but Michael Jordan at his most heroic. Had he walked away from sports all together, and disappeared from the spotlight to never return, it might have taken me a decade and a half to fully understand. Michael Jordan's father, James Jordan Sr. was murdered in July of 1993. The weight of that loss was impossible for me to grasp, and probably still is to some degree. As the 1993-1994 NBA season approached, and details of his father's murder, and the subsequent arrests played out the news, Jordan's grief intensified. At his retirement, Jordan would tell reporters "I went through all the different stages of getting myself prepared for the next year, but the desire..... was not there." Looking back now, it was an unexpected time of vulnerability from someone who in every other way seemed invincible. Michael Jordan was superhuman. I never expected to see his frailty. That fall, MJ began working out at the Comiskey Training Facilities with the Chicago White Sox, and in January, Michael announced his plan to attend Spring Training with the White Sox in Sarasota, Florida. Months later, Phil Jackson, Michael's legendary NBA coach, would say "It was really his father's dream that he play baseball. His father wanted to play pro ball and did play semi-pro. When his father passed away, I think Michael was kind of living out his father's dream."
Michael Jordan played one season of professional baseball before eventually returning to the NBA. Jordan's time as a minor league baseball player is often regarded as a failure. I think that's wrong. Jordan's accomplishments in baseball are unfairly compared to his greatness as a basketball player. There was no level of success he could have reached as a baseball player that could have measured to what he had already accomplished in the NBA. In that sense, he was doomed to fail. However, if you analyze Jordan's baseball career on it's own merits, it's in some ways as remarkable as anything he accomplished in the NBA.
Baseball is really hard. I think that's obvious to most people, but I'm not sure it's widely enough appreciated just how fucking hard we're talking about. There are a lot of people that can dunk a basketball that never played competitively. I used to play a turn-based game with my Dad and brother where we'd all take a three-point shot. If you made it, you got a point. If you missed, you had the opportunity to make two consecutive free-throws to recover the point. The first to five points won. I played the least amount of basketball and was the worst natural shooter of the three of us, but I hated to lose. I quickly realized I wasn't going to be able to match them in shooting threes, so, like a maniac, I spent every evening for about a month shooting hundreds of free throws until I was making them at something around a 75% rate. I broke the game and made it not fun for anyone. The point is, after only a few weeks of practice, I was making free throws at a rate only slightly below the NBA average. As a fairly ordinary athlete and unskilled player, there's at least one thing on a basketball court that, through repetition, I'm capable of doing at a near professional level. The basic fundamentals of the game are accessible to anyone. The difference is, at the professional level, they're played by giant human beings and freak athletes. Baseball takes the same principles and turns them up to 10.
Think of the best baseball player you know. No, it doesn't count that Anthony Rizzo gave you a re-tweet for your Birthday. I'm talking personally. The best baseball player you know is an awful baseball player. About one in 200, or 0.5% of Senior High School baseball players will eventually be drafted by a MLB team. Of that group, only 10% will ever reach the Major Leagues. That's 1 in about every 49,000, or .00002% of the male population will play in the Major Leagues. Michael Jordan, past his athletic prime, and having not played baseball competitively in over a decade, debuted at Double-A. The following comes from Jeff Moore at The Hardball Times (here).
Double-A: The entrance to the “upper minors,” the jump to Double-A tends to be the most difficult for prospects, and tells us the most about them.
The Double-A level is where hitters and pitchers begin to have a plan. This is where pitchers can’t get by without a decent off-speed pitch and the hitters who can’t hit them are exposed. The competition is good, as evidenced by the fact that we see players jump from Double-A to the majors with relative frequency. Each organization has its own philosophy on doing so, but it does happen often because of the advanced level of competition. There aren’t as many players in Double-A with major league experience as there are in Triple-A, but one could argue that the pure talent level is actually higher because players are heading in an upward direction as opposed to the stagnation that tends to take place with some Triple-A players.
I don't know how exactly to illustrate what it would be like for a 31-year old man, regardless of athletic prowess, to pick up a bat for the first time in 12 years in Double-A baseball. It's beyond imaginable. I'll return us for a moment to my experience. I'm obviously not the athlete Jordan was, but I did play baseball up until I was about 15. I had reasonable enough physical skills, but baseball requires a level of self-confidence that borders on insanity. You need to be able to fail between 60-70% of the time as a hitter and yet, immediately forget the failures in order approach the next at bat with absolute confidence. If you can't do that, it makes no difference how skilled you are. At 20, I was invited to play in an adult baseball league, barring a try-out to make sure I wasn't handicapped or anything. In the try-out I put on a laser show, and was happily added to the team. Like I said, the physical skills were there. Unfortunately, after 5 years off, stepping back into a competitive game against pitchers only throwing in the mid-80s, I went 0-14 with 13Ks before my season mercifully ended with all of my equipment being stolen out of my car. I was over-matched early, then, horrified at my own failure, I started swinging at everything. I swung at pitches I never saw. Pitches I never would have swung at in batting practice, with no pressure, just having fun, instead of obsessively thinking "Don't fuck up. Don't fuck up. Don't fuck up." It was a disaster.
That was a league playing with the other 99.5% of baseball players that would never be drafted. Now, imagine doubling the time away from the game, and playing against competition that's the best pure minor league talent. I might have been able to shoot a few thousands free throws and work my way to mediocrity. There's no amount of repetition that would prepare the 99.5% of us to face Double-A hitters or pitchers. You can't practice your way to throwing or hitting 95-mph fastballs. Most of us would be so embarrassingly fucked, it would be like the nightmare I'm sure we've all had of showing up to high school completely naked. You'd stand out.... and not in a good way.
Now, Michael Jordan was bad in his one season at Double-A. In fact, he was one of the worst players at the level. However, at 31-years old, in his first competitive baseball in 12 years, for MJ to blend in and not obviously stand out, was remarkable. He looked like he belonged there. In fact, in the last month of the season, Jordan hit .280. He was basically doing baseball as a hobby at a top .00002% performance level. It's hard to compare Jordan's case to anything because this case had never happened and probably never will again.
There's one other way I can think of looking at this. Baseball is extraordinarily specialized. None more so than the pitcher. Jon Bois once compared pitchers hitting as reflecting our society in becoming hopelessly specialized. He said "Take your Enterprise Rent-A-Car employee and ask him/her to work the next day at Hertz, she's not going to be able to do it. The computer is different, the system is different, everything is different. Which seems really strange because it's basically the same job... Chief among these examples is the pitcher who can't hit." Now, comparing Michael Jordan to pitchers hitting isn't exactly the same thing because pitchers didn't spend 12 years in between at-bats building Hall of Fame basketball careers. In most cases, though, a major league caliber pitcher was also the best hitter on his High School team. Once drafted, they're assigned more specialized roles and hitting becomes far less a priority than developing pitching specific skills. Once in the pros, some pitchers will go as many as several years between at-bats. Because of this, despite being exceptional athletes, and great baseball players, most pitchers are terrible Major League hitters. In 2015, Major League pitchers hit .131 AVG, .158 OBP, .168 SLG, .327 OPS, with a 37.7 K%, and a 2.6 BB%
The rough Major League Equivalent from Triple-A to the Majors is a loss of offensive production near 18% for hitters. From Double-A to the Majors is 36%. We can take MJ's 1994 Double-A season and find the MLE, then compare it to ML pitchers. Jordan hit .202 AVG, .289 OBP, .266 SLG, .556 OPS, with a 22.9 K%, and a 9.75 BB%.
Penalized 36% of the MLE, gives Michael a stat line, compared to ML pitchers, of:
Michael: .129 AVG. .184 OBP, .170 SLG, .354 OPS, 30.7 K%, and a 6.24 BB%
Pitchers: .131 AVG, .158 OBP, .168 SLG, .327 OPS, with a 37.7 K%, and a 2.6 BB%
So, in Michael Jordan's one season, he put up numbers slightly better than the average production of a Major League pitcher. That's incredible. I know this batting line looks awful, and it is, but hopefully by now I've help illustrate, there might not be another person alive who could pick up a bat after 12 years, at 31-years old, and match the production of Major League pitchers. Michael Jordan's baseball career might not have reflected his legendary success on the basketball court, but it should be considered no less remarkable. It's a shame it's remembered by so many as a failure. It wasn't.
"I talk to him more in the subconscious than actual words.... Keep doing what you're doing,' he'd tell me. 'Keep trying to make it happen. You can't be afraid to fail. Don't give a damn about the media.' Then he'd say something funny -- or recall something about when I was a boy, when we'd be in the back- yard playing catch together like we did all the time." - Michael Jordan speaking on his father's presence as he lived out his dream
Sunday, February 21, 2016
Friday, February 5, 2016
Golden Corral (The Poem)
Line at the door, herded in
like cattle to the slaughter
Bribe the ferryman his obol
For awaiting is the fodder
Torment, silence's metronome
as the feet shuffle in rhythm
Grab a fork and a plate
Fall into place, now harmony's victim
The absence of hope
hangs in the air like a fog
Boundless stacks of plates
Off for more we all slog
He took the last god damn biscuit
I think in my head, now annoyed
I'll have to wait for the next batch
An eternity, to fill this infinite void
For dessert, cookies and cake
Can I dip my soul in the chocolate fountain?
Breathing is labored
The air has thinned, at the peak of this mountain
The adventure is now over, Still
Facing some difficulty recovering morale
I offer sage advice: be wary
For shit will get dark at the Golden Corral
like cattle to the slaughter
Bribe the ferryman his obol
For awaiting is the fodder
Torment, silence's metronome
as the feet shuffle in rhythm
Grab a fork and a plate
Fall into place, now harmony's victim
The absence of hope
hangs in the air like a fog
Boundless stacks of plates
Off for more we all slog
He took the last god damn biscuit
I think in my head, now annoyed
I'll have to wait for the next batch
An eternity, to fill this infinite void
For dessert, cookies and cake
Can I dip my soul in the chocolate fountain?
Breathing is labored
The air has thinned, at the peak of this mountain
The adventure is now over, Still
Facing some difficulty recovering morale
I offer sage advice: be wary
For shit will get dark at the Golden Corral
Thursday, January 7, 2016
Why aren't the Dodgers spending?
The Los Angeles Dodgers are Major League Baseball's wealthiest franchise. Due in large part to the team's record $7 billion deal with Time Warner Cable for the club's local TV rights, agreed to in 2013. That off-season the Dodgers increased payroll from a 2012 mark of $152 million, to $240 million in 2013. The trend continued, with a payroll climbing to $246 million in 2014, before peaking at a staggering $302 million in 2015. That 2015 payroll was nearly $113 million over MLB's Luxury Tax ceiling of $189 million. That means, with 2015 marking the third consecutive year Los Angeles had exceeded the Luxury Tax threshold, the organization faced a 40% competitive balance tax on the $113 million difference. Now including penalties, the Dodgers 2015 Major League player expenditures exceeded $347 million. For comparison, the New York Yankees, owners of MLB's second highest payroll, spent $236 million, including penalties. That $111 million gap between the highest and second highest payroll, was a greater sum than the entire player payroll for 11 of the 30 MLB franchises.
Now that we've established the Los Angeles Dodgers have money, you can begin to understand why it's been something of a surprise to see the Dodgers routinely outbid for free agents this off-season. An off-season in which a record breaking amount of money has already been handed out, no less. The most notable for the Dodgers was losing All-Star pitcher Zack Greinke to their small-to-mid market division rival, the Arizona Diamondbacks. It's widely accepted that having Zack Greinke on your team is a good thing. It's also been noted that Greinke had been unusually honest in revealing his intentions to sign with whichever team offered him the most money. All signs were pointing to him returning to LA. So why in the hell did the team with all the money not just offer Greinke more money? It would seem their greatest advantage is the ability to do just that when negotiating with a player all of baseball covets. Aside from being just wealthy, the Dodgers front office is perhaps the greatest collection of minds in a baseball operations department we've ever seen. When they do something unexpected, it's safe to assume there's a good reason for it. So, why are they operating like a small market team?
First, it's important to understand what baseball is. Of course, on it's surface, it's a series of athletic competitions. Step back, and it appears as a series of math problems that can be broken down into various probabilities. Everything from the outcome of each individual pitch, to the odds of winning a World Series can be assigned a probability based on past outcomes or a simulation of outcomes. In this case, the relevant information is the goal of every franchise, the probability of winning the World Series. The 2015 pre-season favorites for both best record and World Series odds was the Washington Nationals. Their 94.7 win projection gave them an 86% chance of winning their division, a 94.5% chance of making the Playoffs, and a 17.0% chance of winning the World Series. Only one other team had odds greater than 10%, the Dodgers (92.1 win projection), with 13.4% odds. Eleven other teams entered 2015 with a greater than 2% chance of winning the title. So, being the best team in baseball gives you, roughly, somewhere between a 15-20% chance of winning. Odds only three times greater than a team with only 50% odds to make the Playoffs.
What does that mean? It's easier to understand if you think of baseball as a lottery drawing. In each season is contained a vat of 1,000 ping-pong balls. The Nationals entered 2015 with 170 ping-pong balls, and the eventual World Series Champion Kansas City Royals entered with just 9. Now, a game theory problem; Let's say we're faced with 10 of these drawings, representing 10 seasons. Dividing resources, wealthy teams get 400 balls each, with poor teams getting roughly 266 balls. The max is 175 balls per vat, and the minimum is 5. This is so that odds in any single given season do not exceed 17.5% while demonstrating that loading up to maximize odds for one season is not sustainable. Representing a rich team, the Dodgers, is it better to?:
A. place your 400 ping-pong balls as to maximize your odds early
B. spread them out, putting 40 in each vat
Here's what that looks like:
A. 17.5%, 17.5%, 1%, 1%, 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.5%
TOTAL ODDS: 36.7671476956%
B. 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%
TOTAL ODDS: 38.6094674556%
Note: The math on that was a son of a bitch. Mostly because I haven't been asked to do much math over the past decade, and I didn't have a handy algorithm for that on my computer.
This reveals setting even a mediocre floor is more effective than pouring all of your resources into a couple high-ceiling opportunities. Beginning in 2013, LA began investing heavily in player development and the international market. In 2015, the Dodgers went over their allotted international spending cap by $20 million, reaching a total investment of over $40 million after signings and penalties. They're investing their wealth in organizational depth, not free-agency. This suggests a shift in strategy for wealthy teams away from spending wildly to purchase expensive free-agent talent in an attempt to maximize short-term odds at the expense of long-term organizational health. The new goal is to use your wealth to set a perennially high floor, giving yourself the greatest odds of success over a longer period of time. Not only is this strategy optimal for competitive purposes, it's also far more cost-effective. The Dodgers are already beginning to see the benefits of building less expensive, organization depth. To this point in the off-season, LA's payroll is down over $100 million from 2015, yet they're projected to win more games in 2016. They've set a very high floor. There's no reason for the Dodgers to invest in players like Greinke, making as much an investment in years as money, when the cost is great and the benefit to their probability of winning is marginal.
Baseball is always evolving, and teams are always finding advantages. The newest trend may be mediocrity. It's simply more cost effective to use your financial resources to build a team with an acceptable median outcome expectancy than to commit to competitive windows, aiming to maximize short terms odds. If you look right now, nineteen teams are currently resting with a projection between 75 and 87 wins. One standard deviation is considered +/- 6 wins. With baseball having freshly entered the new two-Wildcard era, teams aren't spending to be division favorites anymore. The risks outweighs the rewards. Poor teams are aiming to set a median outcome that gives them an opportunity to play themselves into contention, and rich teams are aiming to set a floor that keeps them in wildcard contention. The Los Angeles Dodgers are, if anything, a rich team, and they've already done their part. Investing their wealth into building a strong organizational foundation is a better strategy than using free-agency and market value players as the primary source of talent supplying the Major League roster. The Dodgers are going to be just fine.
Now that we've established the Los Angeles Dodgers have money, you can begin to understand why it's been something of a surprise to see the Dodgers routinely outbid for free agents this off-season. An off-season in which a record breaking amount of money has already been handed out, no less. The most notable for the Dodgers was losing All-Star pitcher Zack Greinke to their small-to-mid market division rival, the Arizona Diamondbacks. It's widely accepted that having Zack Greinke on your team is a good thing. It's also been noted that Greinke had been unusually honest in revealing his intentions to sign with whichever team offered him the most money. All signs were pointing to him returning to LA. So why in the hell did the team with all the money not just offer Greinke more money? It would seem their greatest advantage is the ability to do just that when negotiating with a player all of baseball covets. Aside from being just wealthy, the Dodgers front office is perhaps the greatest collection of minds in a baseball operations department we've ever seen. When they do something unexpected, it's safe to assume there's a good reason for it. So, why are they operating like a small market team?
First, it's important to understand what baseball is. Of course, on it's surface, it's a series of athletic competitions. Step back, and it appears as a series of math problems that can be broken down into various probabilities. Everything from the outcome of each individual pitch, to the odds of winning a World Series can be assigned a probability based on past outcomes or a simulation of outcomes. In this case, the relevant information is the goal of every franchise, the probability of winning the World Series. The 2015 pre-season favorites for both best record and World Series odds was the Washington Nationals. Their 94.7 win projection gave them an 86% chance of winning their division, a 94.5% chance of making the Playoffs, and a 17.0% chance of winning the World Series. Only one other team had odds greater than 10%, the Dodgers (92.1 win projection), with 13.4% odds. Eleven other teams entered 2015 with a greater than 2% chance of winning the title. So, being the best team in baseball gives you, roughly, somewhere between a 15-20% chance of winning. Odds only three times greater than a team with only 50% odds to make the Playoffs.
What does that mean? It's easier to understand if you think of baseball as a lottery drawing. In each season is contained a vat of 1,000 ping-pong balls. The Nationals entered 2015 with 170 ping-pong balls, and the eventual World Series Champion Kansas City Royals entered with just 9. Now, a game theory problem; Let's say we're faced with 10 of these drawings, representing 10 seasons. Dividing resources, wealthy teams get 400 balls each, with poor teams getting roughly 266 balls. The max is 175 balls per vat, and the minimum is 5. This is so that odds in any single given season do not exceed 17.5% while demonstrating that loading up to maximize odds for one season is not sustainable. Representing a rich team, the Dodgers, is it better to?:
A. place your 400 ping-pong balls as to maximize your odds early
B. spread them out, putting 40 in each vat
Here's what that looks like:
A. 17.5%, 17.5%, 1%, 1%, 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.5%, 0.5%
TOTAL ODDS: 36.7671476956%
B. 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%
TOTAL ODDS: 38.6094674556%
Note: The math on that was a son of a bitch. Mostly because I haven't been asked to do much math over the past decade, and I didn't have a handy algorithm for that on my computer.
This reveals setting even a mediocre floor is more effective than pouring all of your resources into a couple high-ceiling opportunities. Beginning in 2013, LA began investing heavily in player development and the international market. In 2015, the Dodgers went over their allotted international spending cap by $20 million, reaching a total investment of over $40 million after signings and penalties. They're investing their wealth in organizational depth, not free-agency. This suggests a shift in strategy for wealthy teams away from spending wildly to purchase expensive free-agent talent in an attempt to maximize short-term odds at the expense of long-term organizational health. The new goal is to use your wealth to set a perennially high floor, giving yourself the greatest odds of success over a longer period of time. Not only is this strategy optimal for competitive purposes, it's also far more cost-effective. The Dodgers are already beginning to see the benefits of building less expensive, organization depth. To this point in the off-season, LA's payroll is down over $100 million from 2015, yet they're projected to win more games in 2016. They've set a very high floor. There's no reason for the Dodgers to invest in players like Greinke, making as much an investment in years as money, when the cost is great and the benefit to their probability of winning is marginal.
Baseball is always evolving, and teams are always finding advantages. The newest trend may be mediocrity. It's simply more cost effective to use your financial resources to build a team with an acceptable median outcome expectancy than to commit to competitive windows, aiming to maximize short terms odds. If you look right now, nineteen teams are currently resting with a projection between 75 and 87 wins. One standard deviation is considered +/- 6 wins. With baseball having freshly entered the new two-Wildcard era, teams aren't spending to be division favorites anymore. The risks outweighs the rewards. Poor teams are aiming to set a median outcome that gives them an opportunity to play themselves into contention, and rich teams are aiming to set a floor that keeps them in wildcard contention. The Los Angeles Dodgers are, if anything, a rich team, and they've already done their part. Investing their wealth into building a strong organizational foundation is a better strategy than using free-agency and market value players as the primary source of talent supplying the Major League roster. The Dodgers are going to be just fine.
Saturday, December 26, 2015
Another poem....
I am so often deluged
By the trepidation of a contiguous life
Washed beneath the surface of a turbulent sea
Still perceptible, the faintest light shines through
Within my grasp, yet the source a million miles away
To what rationale does this light persist?
Derelict remainders, we meander along
Now provoked by a disposition so innate
By instinct, I reach towards the light
By credulity, the light reaches towards me
I emerge once more without resolution
No greater understanding of why this must be
Back on solid footing, I peer at the source,
Unsure to what extent a role it had played
It peers back at me, revealing no secret
Interminable, the only constant I've ever known
I feel it's necessity, the most dense of illusions
The goal is forever in sight
In the depths of despair, it's signature glow,
Sending my aspirations to saunter free
My only doubt as darkness sets again,
Was I born of the light, or the light born of me?
By the trepidation of a contiguous life
Washed beneath the surface of a turbulent sea
Still perceptible, the faintest light shines through
Within my grasp, yet the source a million miles away
To what rationale does this light persist?
Derelict remainders, we meander along
Now provoked by a disposition so innate
By instinct, I reach towards the light
By credulity, the light reaches towards me
I emerge once more without resolution
No greater understanding of why this must be
Back on solid footing, I peer at the source,
Unsure to what extent a role it had played
It peers back at me, revealing no secret
Interminable, the only constant I've ever known
I feel it's necessity, the most dense of illusions
The goal is forever in sight
In the depths of despair, it's signature glow,
Sending my aspirations to saunter free
My only doubt as darkness sets again,
Was I born of the light, or the light born of me?
Tuesday, December 8, 2015
A poem (to the best of my knowledge)
All the blustering of a nor'easters gale
Full of intensity and thrice the chill
Sweeping over both land and sea
With ample warning, it struck us still
Extreme is the force behind this storm
To respond, women and men cannot refrain
Each clash rains a hatred, overflowing,
The run-off seeps into the brain
In a fury, all parties spring to action,
Not knowing how or why
To save us all, sacrifices must be made,
And surely some will die
A biting cold creeps towards the heart,
Unrest aims to destroy what's long been there
Each individual rhythm is unique, isolated,
Vulnerable is the symbol we all share
The wrath peaks, giving way to silence,
We cling to hope, holding our loved ones near
In a sudden flash, the storm breaks,
Is anyone there? as the clouds begin to clear
Full of intensity and thrice the chill
Sweeping over both land and sea
With ample warning, it struck us still
Extreme is the force behind this storm
To respond, women and men cannot refrain
Each clash rains a hatred, overflowing,
The run-off seeps into the brain
In a fury, all parties spring to action,
Not knowing how or why
To save us all, sacrifices must be made,
And surely some will die
A biting cold creeps towards the heart,
Unrest aims to destroy what's long been there
Each individual rhythm is unique, isolated,
Vulnerable is the symbol we all share
The wrath peaks, giving way to silence,
We cling to hope, holding our loved ones near
In a sudden flash, the storm breaks,
Is anyone there? as the clouds begin to clear
Saturday, December 5, 2015
John Lackey persists despite all objections
The Chicago Cubs have signed 37-year old Starting Pitcher John Lackey to a 2-year/$32 million contract. Last night, I responded to that news with a minor tantrum. It was an emotional reaction where I aired my litany of grievances against Lackey, from being a grown man who wears a cowboy hat, to the more serious offense of leaving his wife as she was battling breast cancer. The more I thought about it, the more I started to accept that emotions are stupid when analyzing baseball transactions. So, I decided to take a more rational approach and look at the numbers and what this signing means for the Cubs.
There are two projections on Lackey currently available. The first is his Steamer projection available on FanGraphs (here). Steamer projects Lackey to make 31 starts in 2016, for 190 innings, with a 3.89 ERA. That's an expected WAR of 2.6. Last night, Dan Szymborski tweeted Lackey's two-year ZiPS projection (here). The ZiPS projection was pretty favorable for Lackey and the Cubs, expecting a 3.4 WAR in 2016, and 3.1 WAR in 2017. If he performs at that level, this deal will be quite a success for the Cubs. For comparison, Jordan Zimmermann, who just last week signed a 5-year/$110 million contract with the Detroit Tigers, is projected for 2.5 WAR by Steamer. That means, the Cubs signed a roughly comparable pitcher for fewer years, which equals less risk, and an average annual value that's $6 million less. Despite all my bitching, the Cubs may have found a bargain in Lackey.
My projection for Lackey is more in agreement with the Steamer projection, mostly due to the fact that I don't believe Lackey's performance with RISP is sustainable. I would expect a greater deal of regression than ZiPS is suggesting. Though, it should be noted, my projection is only a product of my feeble brain, and not of complex algorithms like Steamer and ZiPS. My brain is less efficient than a computer at producing everything except the abstract. My expectation is about 2.8 WAR. I believe he'll throw more than 190 innings, but at about the same effectiveness as Steamer projects. When calculating how much this addition improves the Cubs, you can't just simply add Lackey's value, as his expected 31 starts will be replacing something. (Here), in a previous post, I already took a look at what the Cubs had in their rotation prior this signing. Lackey will likely slide into the #3 slot in the Cubs rotation, but the starts he's really replacing, in theory, are the worst 31 in the projection, from the bottom of the Cubs pitching depth. Those starts would have been worth about 1.0 WAR to the team, but replacing those starts with Lackey adds 1.8 WAR to a Cubs team already projected to win 93 games.
How does this effect the rest of the Cubs offseason? you might ask. Well, the expectation was the Cubs could add roughly $20 million to their 2016 payroll. If that's the case, this signing pretty much takes them out of the running for another major free-agent. That seems to be the greatest disappointment coming from the Lackey signing. He's not the exciting splash that every fan wants his team to make. Personally, I wanted the Cubs to give Jason Heyward all of the money and all of the years. Not necessarily because it's the best strategy, or that I wouldn't regret it halfway through the contract. I just wanted to be excited right now. I wanted instant gratification. I will not apologize for this because all evidence suggests: this is who we are. Take it up with your creator, or EVILution, or whoever else you'd like.
So, this leaves a few questions. Are the Cubs going to add another starting pitcher? Are they going to add an elite reliever? Who's going to hit lead-off? Who the hell is going to play Center Field? I don't know any of these things. My suspicion was that if they were going to trade for an impact starting pitcher, it was going to cost them a minimum of Jorge Soler. With limitations on how much payroll they can add, I doubt at this point they'll deal Soler to make another significant addition to the rotation, opening up a second hole in the Outfield. The Cubs had been linked to reliever Darren O'Day early in the off-season, but as interest in O'Day increased, interest from the Cubs seems to have tempered. It now appears the Cubs will employ a similar strategy with the Bullpen as they did, with some success, in 2015. They've already started the process, adding Ryan Cook and Rex Brothers, inexpensive rebound candidates coming off a combination of injuries and poor performance. Center Field is still the biggest area of need. I've thought all along the Cubs were more likely to fill that need through trade than free-agency (including Dexter Fowler). However, yesterday, I found some interesting news that went a bit under the radar. Javier Baez is going to play Center Field this winter in Puerto Rico. If he can do it well, and with his athleticism I'm confident he can, that certainly gives the team some more options. This does not, however, solve the mystery of the likely lead-off hitter. I still don't think that guy is on this team right now. I wish I could offer solutions, but unless the Cubs extend past their comfort level with the payroll, or get creative with some trades, I don't see a clear answer. We know Dexter Fowler is available and can do the job, but he's probably asking for a contract in the 4-years/$60 million range. Denard Span is a slightly less attractive free-agent possibility, expected to receive a contract in the 3-years/$40 million range. A couple weeks ago, the Cubs were rumored to have discussed a Starlin Castro for Brett Gardner deal with the New York Yankees. A deal that would have been a net increase of $6 million to the 2016 payroll. That's a move that fits more with the Cubs budget, and fills the lead-off need, but Gardner profiles best as a Left Fielder. He's been roughly average over the past three seasons in Center Field over a sample of 180 games. Now 32, and signed through 2018, Gardner's defensive decline would only be amplified with a full-time move to Center Field.
There's two main takeaways from this: The Lackey signing was a good deal, and an improvement, despite how much of an asshole he might be. The Cubs definitely still have work to do. All else is guesswork, providing no limit to the number of hot takes to be offered.
There are two projections on Lackey currently available. The first is his Steamer projection available on FanGraphs (here). Steamer projects Lackey to make 31 starts in 2016, for 190 innings, with a 3.89 ERA. That's an expected WAR of 2.6. Last night, Dan Szymborski tweeted Lackey's two-year ZiPS projection (here). The ZiPS projection was pretty favorable for Lackey and the Cubs, expecting a 3.4 WAR in 2016, and 3.1 WAR in 2017. If he performs at that level, this deal will be quite a success for the Cubs. For comparison, Jordan Zimmermann, who just last week signed a 5-year/$110 million contract with the Detroit Tigers, is projected for 2.5 WAR by Steamer. That means, the Cubs signed a roughly comparable pitcher for fewer years, which equals less risk, and an average annual value that's $6 million less. Despite all my bitching, the Cubs may have found a bargain in Lackey.
My projection for Lackey is more in agreement with the Steamer projection, mostly due to the fact that I don't believe Lackey's performance with RISP is sustainable. I would expect a greater deal of regression than ZiPS is suggesting. Though, it should be noted, my projection is only a product of my feeble brain, and not of complex algorithms like Steamer and ZiPS. My brain is less efficient than a computer at producing everything except the abstract. My expectation is about 2.8 WAR. I believe he'll throw more than 190 innings, but at about the same effectiveness as Steamer projects. When calculating how much this addition improves the Cubs, you can't just simply add Lackey's value, as his expected 31 starts will be replacing something. (Here), in a previous post, I already took a look at what the Cubs had in their rotation prior this signing. Lackey will likely slide into the #3 slot in the Cubs rotation, but the starts he's really replacing, in theory, are the worst 31 in the projection, from the bottom of the Cubs pitching depth. Those starts would have been worth about 1.0 WAR to the team, but replacing those starts with Lackey adds 1.8 WAR to a Cubs team already projected to win 93 games.
How does this effect the rest of the Cubs offseason? you might ask. Well, the expectation was the Cubs could add roughly $20 million to their 2016 payroll. If that's the case, this signing pretty much takes them out of the running for another major free-agent. That seems to be the greatest disappointment coming from the Lackey signing. He's not the exciting splash that every fan wants his team to make. Personally, I wanted the Cubs to give Jason Heyward all of the money and all of the years. Not necessarily because it's the best strategy, or that I wouldn't regret it halfway through the contract. I just wanted to be excited right now. I wanted instant gratification. I will not apologize for this because all evidence suggests: this is who we are. Take it up with your creator, or EVILution, or whoever else you'd like.
So, this leaves a few questions. Are the Cubs going to add another starting pitcher? Are they going to add an elite reliever? Who's going to hit lead-off? Who the hell is going to play Center Field? I don't know any of these things. My suspicion was that if they were going to trade for an impact starting pitcher, it was going to cost them a minimum of Jorge Soler. With limitations on how much payroll they can add, I doubt at this point they'll deal Soler to make another significant addition to the rotation, opening up a second hole in the Outfield. The Cubs had been linked to reliever Darren O'Day early in the off-season, but as interest in O'Day increased, interest from the Cubs seems to have tempered. It now appears the Cubs will employ a similar strategy with the Bullpen as they did, with some success, in 2015. They've already started the process, adding Ryan Cook and Rex Brothers, inexpensive rebound candidates coming off a combination of injuries and poor performance. Center Field is still the biggest area of need. I've thought all along the Cubs were more likely to fill that need through trade than free-agency (including Dexter Fowler). However, yesterday, I found some interesting news that went a bit under the radar. Javier Baez is going to play Center Field this winter in Puerto Rico. If he can do it well, and with his athleticism I'm confident he can, that certainly gives the team some more options. This does not, however, solve the mystery of the likely lead-off hitter. I still don't think that guy is on this team right now. I wish I could offer solutions, but unless the Cubs extend past their comfort level with the payroll, or get creative with some trades, I don't see a clear answer. We know Dexter Fowler is available and can do the job, but he's probably asking for a contract in the 4-years/$60 million range. Denard Span is a slightly less attractive free-agent possibility, expected to receive a contract in the 3-years/$40 million range. A couple weeks ago, the Cubs were rumored to have discussed a Starlin Castro for Brett Gardner deal with the New York Yankees. A deal that would have been a net increase of $6 million to the 2016 payroll. That's a move that fits more with the Cubs budget, and fills the lead-off need, but Gardner profiles best as a Left Fielder. He's been roughly average over the past three seasons in Center Field over a sample of 180 games. Now 32, and signed through 2018, Gardner's defensive decline would only be amplified with a full-time move to Center Field.
There's two main takeaways from this: The Lackey signing was a good deal, and an improvement, despite how much of an asshole he might be. The Cubs definitely still have work to do. All else is guesswork, providing no limit to the number of hot takes to be offered.
Monday, November 9, 2015
Chicago Cubs Offseason Preview
First, a brief explanation of how I'm doing to break down each team. I'll post this at the beginning of each Preview.
I'm going to start by going through each position, looking at what the team has at that position looking towards 2016, ultimately giving an expected WAR (Wins Above Replacement) for each position. The base number of wins for a Replacement level team is 47.7, and I'll use that number, combined the with that team's projected WAR, to estimate how many games the 2016 version of that team would win based on the current roster. In my conclusions section, I'll discuss where the team can improve, whether or not there's a realistic path to compete for a title in 2016, and if not, what that team could do to accelerate the rebuilding process.
Catcher - Miguel Montero, David Ross, and Kyle Schwarber are all under contract through at least 2016. I'd expect the breakdown to be Montero (92 games), Schwarber (40 games), and Ross (30 games). Montero will get the bulk of the work, with Ross behind the plate for Jon Lester's starts, and Schwarber getting the Evan Gattis treatment, splitting his time between Outfield, DH in AL parks, and Catching about twice each week. Willson Contreras, who won the Double-A Southern League batting title in 2015, will be added to the 40-man roster, and will likely begin 2016 in Triple-A Iowa. He's expected to debut at some point late in 2016, perhaps September, but with the Cubs already splitting time between three players, it's difficult to project a significant role for him with the Big League club unless injuries force him into the Catching rotation. Miguel Montero has been one of the best pitch framers in the game over the past couple years, averaging about 10 runs saves per 90 games. Some of that value from framing will already be credited to the pitching performance of the guys on the staff that worked with Montero last year, so I'll only apply half of the 10 runs to Miguel, adding 0.5 WAR to his value. Montero's contributions project to about 2.5 WAR. Kyle Schwarber can definitely hit, and at least showed he's not a disaster behind the plate in his debut season, even if he may not be ready to catch the Cubs top of the rotation pitchers. For the 40 games Schwarber will play behind the plate, he'll add about 0.8 WAR. David Ross, despite being a non-hitter at this point in his career, is still solid defensively, and one of baseball's best per-game pitch framers, which is the primary source any value he'll provide. For his 30 games, pairing mostly with Jon Lester, he'll add 0.2 WAR. 2016 projection: 3.5 WAR
1st Base - Anthony Rizzo played first base in 160 of the Cubs 162 regular season games in 2015. I'm sure the organization would like to rest Rizzo slightly more in 2016, but Chris Coghlan, Kris Bryant, and Javier Baez are the only three players on the Cubs current roster who played any first base in 2015, and that was for a combined total of 20-innings. It seems possible the Cubs could have Schwarber fill in occasional, though they may feel he has enough on his plate already, and may not want to add learning yet another position to his development. Dan Vogelbach, rated the #13 prospect in the Cubs system, could see some time at first, especially if there's an injury to Rizzo, but he's not yet been added to the 40-man roster, and could be a victim of the Cubs looming roster crunch, which you can read about here. I'm going to project 150 games for Rizzo, as I'd expect Joe Maddon to make it a point to get him more rest in 2016. To cover the other 12 games, I'll give all 12 to Kris Bryant. With there being plenty of other options to fill in at 3rd base, Sliding Bryant across the diamond for a dozen games is probably the most realistic solution given the Cubs current roster. Anthony Rizzo has put together back-to-back tremendous seasons for the Cubs, and 2016 should be no different. The Cubs can expect about 5.0 WAR from Rizzo in 2016, with 0.5 WAR tacked on from a dozen games of Kris Bryant. 2016 projection: 5.5 WAR
2nd Base - It's nearly impossible to know what to expect out of this position for 2016. Starlin Castro, Javier Baez, Tommy La Stella, Chris Coghlan, and Addison Russell (now firmly entrenched as the starting Shortstop) all saw significant time at second in 2015, and all are under contract for 2016. It's likely at least one of those players will not be on the team come March, but your guess is as good as mine. With Russell at Shortstop full-time, Baez is the Cubs best option at Second Base, but he also holds the most value of the remaining group, making him the most likely to be traded in my mind. Until this mess works itself out, I'm going to split playing time between Castro (80 games), Baez (50 games), La Stella (32 games). Coghlan has proven to be capable of playing second in a pinch, but with the Cubs current depth at the position, it's just not necessary. Castro projects to 0.9 WAR over 80 games. Baez for 50 games is worth 0.9 WAR. La Stella provides 0.2 WAR in his limited role. 2016 projection: 2.0 WAR
3rd Base - Kris Bryant, almost certain to be awarded the 2015 NL Rookie of the Year, will again be the Cubs third baseman in 2016. Bryant was everything Cubs fans could have hoped for at the plate in 2015, but the real surprise was his defense. Bryant entered 2015 with some question as to whether or not his defensive limitations would eventually force the Cubs to move him off the position. Not only has he proven he can stick at third base in the short term, but he measured above average with the glove in his debut season, suggesting third could be his long-term home. The Cubs will want to keep Bryant on a similar playing schedule to Anthony Rizzo, and with Bryant already penciled in for 12 games at first base, and likely to see some time in the outfield, I'll give him 120 games at third, which projects to 5.0 WAR. The remaining 42 games will be split between Javier Baez (30 games) worth 0.5 WAR, and Tommy La Stella (12 games) for no added value above replacement level. 2016 Projection: 5.5 WAR
Shortstop - After Starlin Castro was benched in early August, Addison Russell shifted from second base to shortstop, where he took over full-time duties and never looked back. Much like Bryant at third base, there was some question whether or not shortstop would be the long-term home for Russell, as it's expected, given his frame, he'll naturally add weight and lose range as he ages. However, in 2015, Russell was one of the best defensive infielders in baseball, and actually improved his UZR/150 after shifting from second to shortstop. It will be difficult for Addison to repeat that defensive value again in 2016, but even if he remains above average, his potential for growth and his current value to the Cubs are both enormous. With his patient approach at the plate combined with the ability he showed in the second half of 2015 to pull the ball in the air with some authority, I'm more bullish on Russell's offensive production for 2016 than the projection systems I've seen. In 2015, Addison ranked 28th among all qualified hitters with a 40.7% fly-ball rate, and was one of only three players from that selection with a ground-ball rate above 40%. As you can read here, fewer ground balls lead to more power, and GB rates for hitters don't peak until 24 or 25-years old. Addison Russell is coming off a 21-year old debut season. It stands to reason, his ground-ball rate will to decline as he approaches his prime, meaning his line drive and fly ball rates would see an increase. That fly ball rate in combination with a Pull% in the Top 50, as Russell had in 2015, leads me to believe there's power potential there that hasn't quite shown itself to this point. Over 150 games at Shortstop, Russell projects to 3.0 WAR. With both Baez and Castro still on the roster as of now, there's plenty of depth at this position. Given the current roster, Baez would be the Utility Infielder, and would claim the dozen off days for Russell, worth 0.2 WAR. 2016 Projection: 3.2 WAR
Left Field - Kyle Schwarber should see the bulk of his playing time here. Despite the memories we all have of him stumbling around the outfield against the Mets like the drunk guy on your softball team, by UZR, Schwarber wasn't actually a disaster in left field in 2015. Even if he's a below average defender in left, Kyle's bat is strong enough to provide the club plenty of value. With 40 games already committed to Catcher, and another 10 as the team's DH in Interleague Play, Schwarber will play 100 games in Left Field, worth 2.4 WAR. The other 62 games will go to the veteran utility man, Chris Coghlan, worth 0.4 WAR. 2016 Projection: 2.8 WAR
Center Field - Center Field is the biggest question mark on the team as of today. Dexter Fowler handled the job very well for the Cubs in 2015, but he declined Cubs qualifying offer last week and decided to test free agency. I want to make clear, Cubs fans shouldn't be angry with Fowler for declining the qualifying offer, as the offer is more of a formality on the way to free agency than it is a realistic offer. To explain it as quickly as I can, if a team offers a player the qualifying offer, and the player declines (no player has ever accepted), the team receives a compensation draft pick at the end of the first round if that player signs elsewhere as a free-agent. A team signing a free-agent who was offered a qualifying offer forfeits it's highest draft pick, with the top 10 picks being protected, in which case, that team then forfeits it's next highest draft pick. The reason Fowler, and every other player in the three years since the most recent CBA, would decline the qualifying offer is because the one year offer of $15.8 million, while a significant amount for one season, offers less guaranteed money and less stability than a multi-year deal. I think it's too easy to forget these guys are human beings, often with families. Even if the per-year value of the contract is less, players will almost always value the security of a multi-year deal over a one-year deal. For example, just last year, Michael Cuddyer rejected a $15.3 million qualifying offer from the Colorado Rockies to sign a 2-year/$21 million deal with the New York Mets. Obviously, the per-year value was significantly less, but with all contracts in MLB being guaranteed, the 2-year deal with the Mets provides more guaranteed money, and greater stability for Cuddyer and his family than the one-year offer. Fowler will do even better than that in free agency, as Fangraphs contract crowdsourcing (here) projects Fowler to receive a 4-year/$56 million deal, which I believe is tad low. I wouldn't be surprised if he gets north of $60 million, so declining the Cubs qualifying offer was definitely the right decision for Fowler. However, that doesn't mean he won't sign back with the Cubs, as the Cubs have a need at Center Field that must to be addressed through either trade or free agency. For now, a combination of Albert Almora, Arismendy Alcantara, and Matt Szczur would need to fill Center Field. All reports are that Almora's glove is ready to play in the Majors, but there's still some question as to whether or not he'll hit enough to be a full-time player. Even so, there's far more upside with Almora than Alcantara at this point. Even if Alcantara manages to reduce his K% below 30%, which he's yet to do in over 300 ML at-bats, he still appears destined for a career as a reserve player. Szczur is least skilled off the three, and would likely spend the season in Iowa unless injuries forced him to the Majors. With the Cubs current options, I'd expect Almora to get the majority of the playing time here. If there's one thing we've learned from the advancement of analytics in baseball, it's that we're still pretty bad at projecting who's going to be a good defender. With that knowledge, it's difficult to assign Almora a defensive value until we have more information, so despite the positive reports, I'll just assume average defense out of Albert. For 120 games, Almora is worth 1.0 WAR. Alcantara would clean up the remaining 62 games, for 0.4 WAR. 2016 Projection: 1.4 WAR
Right Field - There are plenty of reports the Cubs will look to improve their outfield defense in 2016, including straight from the front office, leading to speculation that Jorge Soler may be traded this off-season. For now, though, he's still on the team. If he still is come April, he'll be the team's primary Right Fielder. Soler's offensive potential is enormous, but at just 23, he's already something of a defensive liability, which limits his overall value to the club. He could potentially benefit from a shift to a slightly less demanding Left Field, but the Cubs already have a defensively deficient Kyle Schwarber parked in left. As of now, I'll project Soler for 110 games in 2016, for 1.0 WAR. Chris Coghlan would get 34 games, worth 0.2 WAR. The remaining 18 games will go to Kris Bryant, providing 0.5 WAR. 2016 Projection: 1.7 WAR
Starting Pitcher - Among the Cubs 2015 starting pitchers, Jake Arrieta, Jon Lester, Jason Hammel, Kyle Hendricks, Dallas Beeler, and Clayton Richard are all under contract for 2016. Dan Haren (retired) and Tsuyoshi Wada (Japan) are both gone. Eric Jokisch, who made one start in 2014, and 14 starts in Triple-A Iowa in 2015, is also in the mix of potential starters in 2016. Travis Wood will also return, but barring a rash of injuries, it appears the Cubs are committed to using him out of the bullpen. The Cubs #7 prospect, Pierce Johnson, and #30 prospect, Ryan Williams, could debut at some point in 2016, but most of the Cubs pitching depth is at least a year away from contributing to the big league club. As has been reported by nearly every outlet, the Cubs will be actively seeking starting pitching this off-season. For now, let's look at what they already have. There's a 162 games, so the Cubs will need to find 162 starts out of the group they have. I'll divide it up like this: Arrieta (32), Jon Lester (32), Jason Hammel (29), Kyle Hendricks (28), Eric Jokisch (16), Dallas Beeler (16), Clayton Richard (5), and Pierce Johnson (4). You can't really project a major injury for a player, which is why I haven't, but I think this assumes an amount of health for the Cubs four best starters that shouldn't be assumed. If one of those four goes down with an injury, the Cubs would be in significant trouble. Jake Arrieta's 2015 season was remarkable. Even if he pitches as well in 2016, a reasonable amount of regression should be expected. A full 32-start season of Jake Arrieta is worth 5.8 WAR. Jon Lester really had an underrated 2015 that was overshadowed by his previously mentioned teammate. The lefty has been remarkably durable over his career, and another 32-start season in 2016 would provide the Cubs 4.5 WAR. After back-to-back seasons with a strong first-half, followed by second-half struggles, Jason Hammel enters 2016 as a guy with question marks around his reliability. If Hammel wants to remain in the rotation all season, he needs to show the second half spike in HR/FB rate in back-to-back seasons was more bad luck than a product of allowing too much hard contact. Jason Hammel is projected to make 29 starts for 2.2 WAR. Kyle Hendricks took an encouraging step forward in 2015, significantly increasing his K/9, while also improving his GB%. In the second half, he really emerged as the Cubs #3 starter. I have Hendricks making 28 starts in 2016, for 2.7 WAR. After Hendricks, it starts to get ugly. Jokisch gives 16 starts for 0.8 WAR. 16 starts from Dallas Beeler provides 0.5 WAR. Clayton Richards (5 starts) and Pierce Johnson (4 starts) each add 0.1 WAR. 2016 Projection: 16.7 WAR
Relief Pitchers - Travis Wood, Pedro Strop, Justin Grimm, Neil Ramirez, Yoervis Medina, Zac Rosscup, Carl Edwards Jr, and Hector Rondon are all under contract for 2016, and figure to play various roles in the Cubs bullpen. Trevor Cahill, Jason Motte, and Fernando Rodney pitched out of the Cubs pen in 2015 but will be free agents this off-season. Pierce Johnson, mentioned in the Starting pitching column, and the Cubs #19 prospect, Corey Black, could debut in 2016 and find a role out of the bullpen. There's talent here, but with uncertainty around the health of Neil Ramirez already, the Cubs need to add depth here too, and there will be plenty of opportunity in the coming months to do so. Individual values for relief pitchers are so small, instead of breaking down each player, as I've done with the other positions, I'm just going to go straight to total value for the current bullpen. 2016 Projection: 3.0 WAR
Conclusions - As far as position players go, the Cubs have three key objectives this off-season. 1. Improve in Centerfield. 2. Find a lead-off hitter. 3. Improve outfield defense. If the Cubs re-sign Dexter Fowler, that would complete the first two objectives. However, if the front office is confident that Albert Almora, or further down the line, Ian Happ, will take hold of the Center Field job, they may not want to commit long-term to Fowler. In that case, they may opt for a short-term, likely defense-first solution, via trade, as a place holder until one of those two prospects claims the job. If they choose to go that route, and want to avoid using Kyle Schwarber in the lead-off spot, they'll need to trade Jorge Soler to open up a corner outfield spot where they can address objectives 2 and 3. I think that's where the Jason Heyward and Alex Gordon rumors come in to play. The Cubs are in a really good position here. They have multiple options, and resources in the way of both cash and trade pieces to get what they need. You're going to hear a lot of rumors this off-season, as the Cubs are likely to do their homework on all available options. It's going to be interesting to see which direction they go.
The Cubs need to add depth to this pitching staff and it's no secret. Rumors are already flying and will likely continue throughout the off-season. My guess is, if they do pursue one of the elite free-agent starting pitchers, it's less likely they'll extend Jake Arrieta beyond his current arbitration years, through 2017. If they try to add a controllable mid-to-high-end starting pitcher through trade, it's more likely they'll extend Arrieta. Beyond that, I'd expect them to be shopping in the middle range for starting pitching, trying to add some much needed depth. I'm looking for them to add at least two, and possibly three starting pitchers this off-season. At least one of those should be of the caliber to slide into the rotation along Lester and Arrieta, ahead of both Hammel and Hendricks. As far as the bullpen is concerned, Chicago should be looking to add a late-inning reliever. They've already been tied to the premier free agent reliever, Darren O'Day. There's a few interesting options beyond O'Day, but for the Cubs to make significant upgrades, they may need to pursue a trade. I'm sure there will be plenty of rumors around Andrew Miller (Yankees), Craig Kimbrel (Padres), and Aroldis Chapman (Reds). We'll have to wait and see if the Cubs are in on any of those three elite relievers. Beyond adding a late-inning guy, the Cubs will need keep a look out for more big-arm, reclamation projects, like Trevor Cahill in 2015, to bridge the middle innings.
With a total of 45.3 WAR with this current roster, this team would be projected to win 93 games in 2016, which is very good. Even with this talented roster, there's still room for improvement in several areas. This is the time for the team to be bold in using all available resources to round out this roster. Expect the front office to be very aggressive in trying to get the Cubs back to the post-season in 2016 to make another run at that elusive World Series title.
I'm going to start by going through each position, looking at what the team has at that position looking towards 2016, ultimately giving an expected WAR (Wins Above Replacement) for each position. The base number of wins for a Replacement level team is 47.7, and I'll use that number, combined the with that team's projected WAR, to estimate how many games the 2016 version of that team would win based on the current roster. In my conclusions section, I'll discuss where the team can improve, whether or not there's a realistic path to compete for a title in 2016, and if not, what that team could do to accelerate the rebuilding process.
CHICAGO CUBS
Catcher - Miguel Montero, David Ross, and Kyle Schwarber are all under contract through at least 2016. I'd expect the breakdown to be Montero (92 games), Schwarber (40 games), and Ross (30 games). Montero will get the bulk of the work, with Ross behind the plate for Jon Lester's starts, and Schwarber getting the Evan Gattis treatment, splitting his time between Outfield, DH in AL parks, and Catching about twice each week. Willson Contreras, who won the Double-A Southern League batting title in 2015, will be added to the 40-man roster, and will likely begin 2016 in Triple-A Iowa. He's expected to debut at some point late in 2016, perhaps September, but with the Cubs already splitting time between three players, it's difficult to project a significant role for him with the Big League club unless injuries force him into the Catching rotation. Miguel Montero has been one of the best pitch framers in the game over the past couple years, averaging about 10 runs saves per 90 games. Some of that value from framing will already be credited to the pitching performance of the guys on the staff that worked with Montero last year, so I'll only apply half of the 10 runs to Miguel, adding 0.5 WAR to his value. Montero's contributions project to about 2.5 WAR. Kyle Schwarber can definitely hit, and at least showed he's not a disaster behind the plate in his debut season, even if he may not be ready to catch the Cubs top of the rotation pitchers. For the 40 games Schwarber will play behind the plate, he'll add about 0.8 WAR. David Ross, despite being a non-hitter at this point in his career, is still solid defensively, and one of baseball's best per-game pitch framers, which is the primary source any value he'll provide. For his 30 games, pairing mostly with Jon Lester, he'll add 0.2 WAR. 2016 projection: 3.5 WAR
1st Base - Anthony Rizzo played first base in 160 of the Cubs 162 regular season games in 2015. I'm sure the organization would like to rest Rizzo slightly more in 2016, but Chris Coghlan, Kris Bryant, and Javier Baez are the only three players on the Cubs current roster who played any first base in 2015, and that was for a combined total of 20-innings. It seems possible the Cubs could have Schwarber fill in occasional, though they may feel he has enough on his plate already, and may not want to add learning yet another position to his development. Dan Vogelbach, rated the #13 prospect in the Cubs system, could see some time at first, especially if there's an injury to Rizzo, but he's not yet been added to the 40-man roster, and could be a victim of the Cubs looming roster crunch, which you can read about here. I'm going to project 150 games for Rizzo, as I'd expect Joe Maddon to make it a point to get him more rest in 2016. To cover the other 12 games, I'll give all 12 to Kris Bryant. With there being plenty of other options to fill in at 3rd base, Sliding Bryant across the diamond for a dozen games is probably the most realistic solution given the Cubs current roster. Anthony Rizzo has put together back-to-back tremendous seasons for the Cubs, and 2016 should be no different. The Cubs can expect about 5.0 WAR from Rizzo in 2016, with 0.5 WAR tacked on from a dozen games of Kris Bryant. 2016 projection: 5.5 WAR
2nd Base - It's nearly impossible to know what to expect out of this position for 2016. Starlin Castro, Javier Baez, Tommy La Stella, Chris Coghlan, and Addison Russell (now firmly entrenched as the starting Shortstop) all saw significant time at second in 2015, and all are under contract for 2016. It's likely at least one of those players will not be on the team come March, but your guess is as good as mine. With Russell at Shortstop full-time, Baez is the Cubs best option at Second Base, but he also holds the most value of the remaining group, making him the most likely to be traded in my mind. Until this mess works itself out, I'm going to split playing time between Castro (80 games), Baez (50 games), La Stella (32 games). Coghlan has proven to be capable of playing second in a pinch, but with the Cubs current depth at the position, it's just not necessary. Castro projects to 0.9 WAR over 80 games. Baez for 50 games is worth 0.9 WAR. La Stella provides 0.2 WAR in his limited role. 2016 projection: 2.0 WAR
3rd Base - Kris Bryant, almost certain to be awarded the 2015 NL Rookie of the Year, will again be the Cubs third baseman in 2016. Bryant was everything Cubs fans could have hoped for at the plate in 2015, but the real surprise was his defense. Bryant entered 2015 with some question as to whether or not his defensive limitations would eventually force the Cubs to move him off the position. Not only has he proven he can stick at third base in the short term, but he measured above average with the glove in his debut season, suggesting third could be his long-term home. The Cubs will want to keep Bryant on a similar playing schedule to Anthony Rizzo, and with Bryant already penciled in for 12 games at first base, and likely to see some time in the outfield, I'll give him 120 games at third, which projects to 5.0 WAR. The remaining 42 games will be split between Javier Baez (30 games) worth 0.5 WAR, and Tommy La Stella (12 games) for no added value above replacement level. 2016 Projection: 5.5 WAR
Shortstop - After Starlin Castro was benched in early August, Addison Russell shifted from second base to shortstop, where he took over full-time duties and never looked back. Much like Bryant at third base, there was some question whether or not shortstop would be the long-term home for Russell, as it's expected, given his frame, he'll naturally add weight and lose range as he ages. However, in 2015, Russell was one of the best defensive infielders in baseball, and actually improved his UZR/150 after shifting from second to shortstop. It will be difficult for Addison to repeat that defensive value again in 2016, but even if he remains above average, his potential for growth and his current value to the Cubs are both enormous. With his patient approach at the plate combined with the ability he showed in the second half of 2015 to pull the ball in the air with some authority, I'm more bullish on Russell's offensive production for 2016 than the projection systems I've seen. In 2015, Addison ranked 28th among all qualified hitters with a 40.7% fly-ball rate, and was one of only three players from that selection with a ground-ball rate above 40%. As you can read here, fewer ground balls lead to more power, and GB rates for hitters don't peak until 24 or 25-years old. Addison Russell is coming off a 21-year old debut season. It stands to reason, his ground-ball rate will to decline as he approaches his prime, meaning his line drive and fly ball rates would see an increase. That fly ball rate in combination with a Pull% in the Top 50, as Russell had in 2015, leads me to believe there's power potential there that hasn't quite shown itself to this point. Over 150 games at Shortstop, Russell projects to 3.0 WAR. With both Baez and Castro still on the roster as of now, there's plenty of depth at this position. Given the current roster, Baez would be the Utility Infielder, and would claim the dozen off days for Russell, worth 0.2 WAR. 2016 Projection: 3.2 WAR
Left Field - Kyle Schwarber should see the bulk of his playing time here. Despite the memories we all have of him stumbling around the outfield against the Mets like the drunk guy on your softball team, by UZR, Schwarber wasn't actually a disaster in left field in 2015. Even if he's a below average defender in left, Kyle's bat is strong enough to provide the club plenty of value. With 40 games already committed to Catcher, and another 10 as the team's DH in Interleague Play, Schwarber will play 100 games in Left Field, worth 2.4 WAR. The other 62 games will go to the veteran utility man, Chris Coghlan, worth 0.4 WAR. 2016 Projection: 2.8 WAR
Center Field - Center Field is the biggest question mark on the team as of today. Dexter Fowler handled the job very well for the Cubs in 2015, but he declined Cubs qualifying offer last week and decided to test free agency. I want to make clear, Cubs fans shouldn't be angry with Fowler for declining the qualifying offer, as the offer is more of a formality on the way to free agency than it is a realistic offer. To explain it as quickly as I can, if a team offers a player the qualifying offer, and the player declines (no player has ever accepted), the team receives a compensation draft pick at the end of the first round if that player signs elsewhere as a free-agent. A team signing a free-agent who was offered a qualifying offer forfeits it's highest draft pick, with the top 10 picks being protected, in which case, that team then forfeits it's next highest draft pick. The reason Fowler, and every other player in the three years since the most recent CBA, would decline the qualifying offer is because the one year offer of $15.8 million, while a significant amount for one season, offers less guaranteed money and less stability than a multi-year deal. I think it's too easy to forget these guys are human beings, often with families. Even if the per-year value of the contract is less, players will almost always value the security of a multi-year deal over a one-year deal. For example, just last year, Michael Cuddyer rejected a $15.3 million qualifying offer from the Colorado Rockies to sign a 2-year/$21 million deal with the New York Mets. Obviously, the per-year value was significantly less, but with all contracts in MLB being guaranteed, the 2-year deal with the Mets provides more guaranteed money, and greater stability for Cuddyer and his family than the one-year offer. Fowler will do even better than that in free agency, as Fangraphs contract crowdsourcing (here) projects Fowler to receive a 4-year/$56 million deal, which I believe is tad low. I wouldn't be surprised if he gets north of $60 million, so declining the Cubs qualifying offer was definitely the right decision for Fowler. However, that doesn't mean he won't sign back with the Cubs, as the Cubs have a need at Center Field that must to be addressed through either trade or free agency. For now, a combination of Albert Almora, Arismendy Alcantara, and Matt Szczur would need to fill Center Field. All reports are that Almora's glove is ready to play in the Majors, but there's still some question as to whether or not he'll hit enough to be a full-time player. Even so, there's far more upside with Almora than Alcantara at this point. Even if Alcantara manages to reduce his K% below 30%, which he's yet to do in over 300 ML at-bats, he still appears destined for a career as a reserve player. Szczur is least skilled off the three, and would likely spend the season in Iowa unless injuries forced him to the Majors. With the Cubs current options, I'd expect Almora to get the majority of the playing time here. If there's one thing we've learned from the advancement of analytics in baseball, it's that we're still pretty bad at projecting who's going to be a good defender. With that knowledge, it's difficult to assign Almora a defensive value until we have more information, so despite the positive reports, I'll just assume average defense out of Albert. For 120 games, Almora is worth 1.0 WAR. Alcantara would clean up the remaining 62 games, for 0.4 WAR. 2016 Projection: 1.4 WAR
Right Field - There are plenty of reports the Cubs will look to improve their outfield defense in 2016, including straight from the front office, leading to speculation that Jorge Soler may be traded this off-season. For now, though, he's still on the team. If he still is come April, he'll be the team's primary Right Fielder. Soler's offensive potential is enormous, but at just 23, he's already something of a defensive liability, which limits his overall value to the club. He could potentially benefit from a shift to a slightly less demanding Left Field, but the Cubs already have a defensively deficient Kyle Schwarber parked in left. As of now, I'll project Soler for 110 games in 2016, for 1.0 WAR. Chris Coghlan would get 34 games, worth 0.2 WAR. The remaining 18 games will go to Kris Bryant, providing 0.5 WAR. 2016 Projection: 1.7 WAR
Starting Pitcher - Among the Cubs 2015 starting pitchers, Jake Arrieta, Jon Lester, Jason Hammel, Kyle Hendricks, Dallas Beeler, and Clayton Richard are all under contract for 2016. Dan Haren (retired) and Tsuyoshi Wada (Japan) are both gone. Eric Jokisch, who made one start in 2014, and 14 starts in Triple-A Iowa in 2015, is also in the mix of potential starters in 2016. Travis Wood will also return, but barring a rash of injuries, it appears the Cubs are committed to using him out of the bullpen. The Cubs #7 prospect, Pierce Johnson, and #30 prospect, Ryan Williams, could debut at some point in 2016, but most of the Cubs pitching depth is at least a year away from contributing to the big league club. As has been reported by nearly every outlet, the Cubs will be actively seeking starting pitching this off-season. For now, let's look at what they already have. There's a 162 games, so the Cubs will need to find 162 starts out of the group they have. I'll divide it up like this: Arrieta (32), Jon Lester (32), Jason Hammel (29), Kyle Hendricks (28), Eric Jokisch (16), Dallas Beeler (16), Clayton Richard (5), and Pierce Johnson (4). You can't really project a major injury for a player, which is why I haven't, but I think this assumes an amount of health for the Cubs four best starters that shouldn't be assumed. If one of those four goes down with an injury, the Cubs would be in significant trouble. Jake Arrieta's 2015 season was remarkable. Even if he pitches as well in 2016, a reasonable amount of regression should be expected. A full 32-start season of Jake Arrieta is worth 5.8 WAR. Jon Lester really had an underrated 2015 that was overshadowed by his previously mentioned teammate. The lefty has been remarkably durable over his career, and another 32-start season in 2016 would provide the Cubs 4.5 WAR. After back-to-back seasons with a strong first-half, followed by second-half struggles, Jason Hammel enters 2016 as a guy with question marks around his reliability. If Hammel wants to remain in the rotation all season, he needs to show the second half spike in HR/FB rate in back-to-back seasons was more bad luck than a product of allowing too much hard contact. Jason Hammel is projected to make 29 starts for 2.2 WAR. Kyle Hendricks took an encouraging step forward in 2015, significantly increasing his K/9, while also improving his GB%. In the second half, he really emerged as the Cubs #3 starter. I have Hendricks making 28 starts in 2016, for 2.7 WAR. After Hendricks, it starts to get ugly. Jokisch gives 16 starts for 0.8 WAR. 16 starts from Dallas Beeler provides 0.5 WAR. Clayton Richards (5 starts) and Pierce Johnson (4 starts) each add 0.1 WAR. 2016 Projection: 16.7 WAR
Relief Pitchers - Travis Wood, Pedro Strop, Justin Grimm, Neil Ramirez, Yoervis Medina, Zac Rosscup, Carl Edwards Jr, and Hector Rondon are all under contract for 2016, and figure to play various roles in the Cubs bullpen. Trevor Cahill, Jason Motte, and Fernando Rodney pitched out of the Cubs pen in 2015 but will be free agents this off-season. Pierce Johnson, mentioned in the Starting pitching column, and the Cubs #19 prospect, Corey Black, could debut in 2016 and find a role out of the bullpen. There's talent here, but with uncertainty around the health of Neil Ramirez already, the Cubs need to add depth here too, and there will be plenty of opportunity in the coming months to do so. Individual values for relief pitchers are so small, instead of breaking down each player, as I've done with the other positions, I'm just going to go straight to total value for the current bullpen. 2016 Projection: 3.0 WAR
Conclusions - As far as position players go, the Cubs have three key objectives this off-season. 1. Improve in Centerfield. 2. Find a lead-off hitter. 3. Improve outfield defense. If the Cubs re-sign Dexter Fowler, that would complete the first two objectives. However, if the front office is confident that Albert Almora, or further down the line, Ian Happ, will take hold of the Center Field job, they may not want to commit long-term to Fowler. In that case, they may opt for a short-term, likely defense-first solution, via trade, as a place holder until one of those two prospects claims the job. If they choose to go that route, and want to avoid using Kyle Schwarber in the lead-off spot, they'll need to trade Jorge Soler to open up a corner outfield spot where they can address objectives 2 and 3. I think that's where the Jason Heyward and Alex Gordon rumors come in to play. The Cubs are in a really good position here. They have multiple options, and resources in the way of both cash and trade pieces to get what they need. You're going to hear a lot of rumors this off-season, as the Cubs are likely to do their homework on all available options. It's going to be interesting to see which direction they go.
The Cubs need to add depth to this pitching staff and it's no secret. Rumors are already flying and will likely continue throughout the off-season. My guess is, if they do pursue one of the elite free-agent starting pitchers, it's less likely they'll extend Jake Arrieta beyond his current arbitration years, through 2017. If they try to add a controllable mid-to-high-end starting pitcher through trade, it's more likely they'll extend Arrieta. Beyond that, I'd expect them to be shopping in the middle range for starting pitching, trying to add some much needed depth. I'm looking for them to add at least two, and possibly three starting pitchers this off-season. At least one of those should be of the caliber to slide into the rotation along Lester and Arrieta, ahead of both Hammel and Hendricks. As far as the bullpen is concerned, Chicago should be looking to add a late-inning reliever. They've already been tied to the premier free agent reliever, Darren O'Day. There's a few interesting options beyond O'Day, but for the Cubs to make significant upgrades, they may need to pursue a trade. I'm sure there will be plenty of rumors around Andrew Miller (Yankees), Craig Kimbrel (Padres), and Aroldis Chapman (Reds). We'll have to wait and see if the Cubs are in on any of those three elite relievers. Beyond adding a late-inning guy, the Cubs will need keep a look out for more big-arm, reclamation projects, like Trevor Cahill in 2015, to bridge the middle innings.
With a total of 45.3 WAR with this current roster, this team would be projected to win 93 games in 2016, which is very good. Even with this talented roster, there's still room for improvement in several areas. This is the time for the team to be bold in using all available resources to round out this roster. Expect the front office to be very aggressive in trying to get the Cubs back to the post-season in 2016 to make another run at that elusive World Series title.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
